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Monthly Intake
January 1981 – March 2019
ASRS Report Volume Profile
Aviation Safety Reporting System
 Over 43 years of 
confidential safety 
reporting
 Over 1,631,000 reports 
received
 Over 6,590 alert 
messages issued
 Over 8,425 reports per 
month, or 405 per 
working day
 Total report intake for 
2018 was 99,010
 Report intake estimate 
for 2019 is over 102,000
Incident Reporter Distribution
April 2018 – March 2019
n = 101,101
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
ASAP Reporting to ASRS
 ASAP Reporting  
• 263 Total Programs
• 138 Air Carriers/Operators
 Reporting Groups
• 133 Pilot
• 57 Maintenance
• 46 Dispatch
• 23 Flight Attendant
• 4 Other (Including Ground Crew, etc.)
 Majority are received through Secure Electronic Data 
Transmission protocols 
 Paper form submissions continue to be received at ASRS 
ASRS Electronic Transmission 
Protocol compatible with numerous 
software platforms
More programs being
added continuously
24.4% of all reports are matched to unique events in 2018
ASRS Safety Telecon Topics
September 2018 – March 2019 (Since Last Infoshare)
Recent ASRS Telecon Topics
A320 ACARS Data Transmissions Blocks VHF B737NG Uncommanded Roll With Spoiler Use
Aspen Evolution PFD Failure Piper PA28 Alternator Failure
ATC Insufficient Staffing/TMU Flow Management Concerns CRJ-200 Water in Pitot Static System
Air Ambulance Operations in IAD Class B Airspace B737 Incorrect Arming of Evacuation Slides
CPDLC ATC Clearance Issues MDT Airspace Issues
CE-525A Stabilizer Trim Frozen in Cruise Flight C206 Rudder Cable Failure
A320 Flight Crew O2 Dispatch Requirements CLT RNAV STAR BANKR2 Crossing Restrictions
FLL Class C Not Sufficient for Current Traffic Levels CL35 False Dual Engine Fire Warning
B737-800 Broken Flight Control Cables NMAC at Non Towered Airport
Part Installation Related Alerts
 B787 Nose Landing Gear Pin Installation Issue
 B777 Engine Fire Panel Installation Issue
 EMB-145 Horizontal Pitch Trim Switch Improper 
Installation
 E170 Engine Fire Bottle Installation
 CRJ-900 PFD Display Cooling Fan Installation Procedure
 DHC-8-100 Flap Track Installation Procedure Confusion
 CE560 Mode Control Panel Installation Error
 Incorrect Installation of B737-800 Master Recall System 
Display
• Incorrect or Deficient Procedures/Manuals
• Complex and/or Confusing IPCs
• Interchangeable Parts, “It fits, it must be right”
• Distractions, Interruptions, Time Pressure
• Inadequate Shift Change Briefings
• Manpower/Staffing Levels
• Stores Delivering Wrong Part
• Clone Part Numbers
• Part Labeling Deficiencies
Commonly Reported Part Installation Issues
CAST Safety Enhancements (SE002, SE014, SE015, SE016, SE017, SE018, SE019, SE026, SE027, 
SE131, SE169, SE172)
 ASRS received a report from an air carrier 
Maintenance Technician describing a 
potential safety hazard with the 
installation of the B787 nose gear locking 
pin
B787 Nose Landing Gear Pin Installation Issue
(Report 1482673) 
 Reporter stated the pin could easily be 
installed in the drag brace pivot link by 
mistake, which could lead to a gear collapse 
during ground testing
 Reporter recommended corrective action be 
taken to prevent installation errors
 This may have contributed to the Ethiopian 
Airlines B787 nose gear collapse at the gate 
in March 2016
B787 Nose Landing Gear Pin Installation Issue
(Report 1482673) 
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Did We Get Our Wires Crossed?
ASRS received a report describing an 
Embraer 170 aircraft with engine fire 
bottle cartridges and discharge outlets 
installed at incorrect positions ACN 1050457
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Did We Get Our Wires Crossed?
 The configuration of the fire extinguishing agent 
plumbing system can pose a potential challenge to 
maintenance personnel
 Several design features appear to have been used to 
mitigate a possible system misconfiguration
 However, this report shows it is still possible to install 
the components in the wrong position
 The reporter indicated that “in the worst case, if both 
bottles were affected, neither engine would have fire 
protection, with extreme risk for loss of life.”
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Embraer E170 Fire Bottle Installation
(Report 1050457)
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This graphic is for illustrative purposes only and not to be used for any other purpose.
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Embraer E170 Fire Bottle Installation
(Report 1050457)
 Currently, there is no AD for the E170 Engine or APU 
Fire Extinguishing System
 AD 2013-05-12 for the E170 addresses the similar 
problem for the forward and aft cargo compartments
 AD 2004-23-19 is applicable to E135 and E145 series 
airplanes to prevent the inability to put out a fire
• General visual inspection to detect incorrect wiring  
• Modify electrical harnesses by adjusting the length  
• Install identification sleeves on the harness and 
connectors and matching color-coded stickers on 
the fire bottles  
 Maintenance Technician had to spend an inordinate 
amount of time researching whether a particular part 
is correct for a specific aircraft tail number
 Event Details:
• Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) – Line Operations Safety Audit 
• A320 required a Spoiler Elevator Computer replacement (SEC)
• Technician used EDOC for part effectivity research – Process was 
described as “…very challenging and time consuming…”
• Technician spent 1.5 hours to determine part effectivity, Parts store 
personnel spent 1 hour working out the same issue
• Reporter stated “It has been documented in the past that 
wrong parts have been installed on aircrafts due to the 
inefficiencies of the IPC system.”
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Parts Effectivity  (ACN 1602166) 
 B737 Maintenance crew reported that the 
Emergency Door Slides were inadvertently installed 
on the incorrect door
 Event Details:
• Slide assemblies were removed and placed on jetway floor
• Cleaners showed up to sanitize the aircraft – slide positions 
may have inadvertently been disturbed
• “Assemblies were re-installed/swapped into wrong 
positions.”
• It was suggested cleaners should not be allowed to access 
the aircraft during maintenance tasks and  “…include a 
sign-off requiring visual confirmation of slide case-to-
correct door orientation.”
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The Old Shell Game  (ACN 1577311) 
 Maintenance Technicians reported installing the 
incorrect wheel assembly on a Boeing 737-900
 Event Details:
• Tire #4 replacement called
• Correct part number was order from stores
• Incorrect tire was delivered with green wheel covers
• Technicians reportedly never looked at the part number 
delivered
• Reporter stated “We need to be more diligent in verifying 
correct part numbers for tire and wheel assemblies are 
correct before installation. 737-800 and 900 carbon brake 
tires will have the same green covers on wheel 
assemblies.”
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Don’t Judge a Book by Its Cover  (ACN 1538518) 
 B767 Maintenance Technician reported that an 
incorrect O-ring was installed on the engine oil 
Magnetic Chip Detector
 Event Details:
• Task – Several open log items and #2 engine MCD callout 
on a through trip
• Difficulty identifying the correct MCD O-rings- Parts Desk 
Assisted, parts replaced, flight departed… no problems
• Next night different AMTs identified different part numbers
• Engineering confirmed wrong part installed previous day, 
made callout for next station to replace
• Parts same material but very slightly smaller
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Part Number Mystery  (ACN 1537568) 
 Lead Technician reported that an incorrect O2 mask 
was installed on the portable oxygen bottle in a 
CRJ-900
 Event Details:
• “…flight crew wrote up that the wrong Oxygen (O2) mask 
was installed at the aft portable O2 bottle.”
• It was discovered that “…the 4 LPM (Liters Per Minute) 
bag was tagged INOP and a solid tube was sticking out of 
the bag, indicating that a demo O2 mask was installed.”
• Mask installation requires an operational check and 
reportedly, the 4 LPM Mask must remain connected to the 
bottle
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“The Bag May Not Inflate, but….”  (ACN 1531763) 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
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